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SWIFT
'
S DISCOURSE OF POLITICS AND POLITICS  
OF DISCOURSE: DISENFRANCHISMENT THROUGH
 DEFINITION
D
an Doll
University of New Orleans
In Some Thoughts on the Present State of Affairs May 1714,
 
written in his retirement at Letcombe Bassett after the break between
 Harley and Bolingbroke, Jonathan Swift reflects upon his service as
 propaganda master in the turbulent Harley ministry and offers a most
 successful way to manage an argument: "In all
 
Contests the safest Way  
is to put those we dispute with, as much in the Wrong as we can.”1
 One of the best
 
ways to put  them in the wrong is to subvert their words  
and thus destroy the 
foe 
by  destroying his words. The strategy of much  
of Swift's prose 
is
 to assert political control over his opponents by  
asserting control over their language. He seeks to disenfranchise his
 foes by denying them control over their own words. By continually
 calling attention to what he deems their misuse of words and then
 "correcting” those words, Swift establishes his political power. Swift
 employs a number of rhetorical strategies to accomplish this
 appropriation: he uses signal
 
phrases like "under  the Name” to suggest  
a distance between word and thing; he treats his opponents' figurative
 language as if it were literal and vice versa; and, most frequently, he
 defines or redefines a key word in his own or his foes' argument.
 
Indeed,
 many of his works revolve  around  a definition or redefinition of  
a specific word like "Protestant,” "Moderate,” or "Subjection,” and
 demonstrate the abuses of religion and politics wrought by his
 opponent's misuse of that word. The opening sentence of On the
 Testimony of Conscience offers a typical example: "There is no Word
 more frequently in the Mouths of Men, titan that of Conscience, and the
 Meaning of it 
is
 in some Measure generally understood: However,,,it  
is likewise a Word extreamly abused by many People, who apply other
 Meanings to it, which God Almighty never intended” (9: 150), He
 then provides his own definition in order to reassert the proper word-
 thing relationship 
and
 consequently to reassert  the proper religious and  
political behavior. What is at stake in such
 
definitions and redefinitions  
is power, control of language as control of political power and control  
of political power as control of
 
language. In this use of  definition for  
polemical purposes, we see one
 
of the  great paradoxes of Swift's work:  
he is desperately afraid of the consequences of the abuse of 
t
he word ­
thing relationship, but at the same time he faces the need to get
 political work done and recognizes that to do so he must use what he
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sees as his foes’ own methods. He demonstrates brilliance in
 
manipulating language, often
 
in the very process of censuring others for  
exactly the 
same 
abuse.
Two purposes underlie Swift’s use of definition: lexical purity and
 polemical effectiveness. As for the first, the same impulse that leads
 Swift to write A Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining
 the English Tongue causes 
him
 to define as a way  of “fixing” words  by  
specifying the word-thing relationship at least in this place at this 
time. Although the preponderance of Swift’s definitions are polem cal, a few
 are straightforward attempts to assert lexical 
accuracy.
 Of the few non-  
polemical
 
examples, most define  legal, technical,  or other “hard” words.  
Another class of relatively non-polemical definitions contains Swift’s
 pronouncements on the “proper” meaning of common words, the most
 well-known of which is “Proper Words in Proper Places, makes the true
 Definition of Stile” (9: 65). These few pronouncements invariably
 refer to some form of social behavior or taste rather than to partisan
 politics, although the two are never entirely separate in Swift’s world.
 In these instances Swift deploys his definitions as a base from which to
 lecture upon “proper” behavior; such lectures are indeed a kind of
 argument but these arguments certainly depend less upon an aggressive
 manipulation of language than his political arguments. For example,
 Swift opens On Good-Manners and Good-Breeding with the definition,
 “Good-Manners is the Art of making
 
those People easy with whom we  
converse” (4: 
213),
 and a little  later  adds a  definition on the obverse of  
good manners: “Pedantry is properly the overrating any Kind of
 Knowledge we pretend to” (4: 215). After these definitions Swift
 explains what kinds of behavior fall under each term, and in doing so he
 is indeed arguing. At the same time, however, the control of these
 specific words—“good-manners” and “pedantry”—is not the central
 purpose of the definitions or the essay, nor is he attacking or
 “Correcting” an opponent’s use of these words.
Swift’s careful attention to definition in an attempt to “fix” the
 
word-thing relationship in the interest of lexical correctness is, of
 course, not unique: indeed, a careful definition of 
words
 and terms is a  
central tenet of virtually every post-Baconian philosopher, including
 Hobbes and Locke. One of the main aims of
 
these philosophers is to  
avoid the linguistic hairsplitting and “tedious disputes over words” of
 the Schoolmen, and definition is usually seen as the first and best
 defense. Bacon claims, “It is almost necessary, in all controversies and
 disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting
 down in the very beginning the definition of our words and terms, that
 others
 
may know  how we accept and understand them, and whether they
2
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concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we
 
are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in
 questions and differences about words.”2 Hobbes also calls for strict,
 formal definitions 
as
 the foundation of philosophy: “The light of  
human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first
 snuffed, and purged from ambiguity.”3 One of the achievements Sprat
 boasts of in his History of 
the
 Royal Society is how the members have  
reformed the abuses of the Schoolmen by replacing the Schoolmen’s
 words with “things” secured by experimentation and
 
careful definition.  
Swift agrees wholeheartedly with this refutation, as evidenced, for
 instance, by his treatment of Scotus and other Schoolmen as dunces and
 frauds in the episodes on
 
Glubbdubdrib, the Island of Sorcerers, in Book  
III
 
of Gulliver’s Travels, and he agrees with the goal of a one word-one  
thing relationship. His difference, however, is that while he sees
 definition as one way to achieve this goal, he does not agree that it 
is the only way nor that
 
there is only one way of defining as Hobbes and  
Locke have it. Swift accomplishes his definitions not primarily
 through the rigorous, formal, mathematical definitions of
 
the logicians  
and philosophers, but rather through a variety of informal definitions
 and rhetorical devices. Also unlike Hobbes, Locke, and most of his
 predecessors, Swift is much more likely to apply definition to the
 words of others than to his own.
Throughout his Essay Locke does indeed purge the words he
 
intends to use of their earlier accretions; as
 
he announces the purpose of  
his work in “The Epistle to the Reader,” “It is ambition enough to be
 employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and
 removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge.”4
 Accumulated misdefinitions are
 
a part of the rubbish  he is clearing. For  
example, in his definition of 
“
man” Locke claims, “I think that to one  
who desired to know what Idea the word Man stood for; if it should be
 said, that Man was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense,
 spontaneous Motion, and 
the
 Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the  
meaning of the term Man, would be as well understood, and the Idea it
 stands for be at least 
as
 clearly made known, as when it is defined to be  
a rational Animal...,I have in explaining the term Man, followed here
 the ordinary Definition of the Schools.”5 But
 
while Locke then builds  
upon the ground he has cleared, Swift is far more interested in
 appropriating the ground he 
is
 clearing or at least in scorching the  
ground to deny it to the opposition. Sometimes he simply wishes to
 reconnect the original “correct” thing with the correct word, but far
 more often his redefinitions serve as the preface and opening sally in
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some argument; he will not only “clear the ground,” 
as
 Locke would  
have it, but will also advance a considerable way over it under the cover
 of definition
 
or redefinition. In the fourth Drapier’s Letter Swift attacks  
the claim that Ireland is “a depending Kingdom” by objecting to this
 phrase as “a modern Term of Art” repudiating what his opposition
 means by it
—
“that the People of Ireland is in some State of Slavery or  
Dependence, different from those of England,” and redefines the
 “dependence” 
as
 the loyalty and legal obligations both nations owe the  
King (10: 62). Swift advances more than lexical propriety here; rather
 he reiterates one of the major tenets in his argument against Wood’s
 halfpence: the English Parliament has no legal right to legislate for
 Ireland, in this case as to what is or is not legal
 tender.
 If Swift’s reader  
accepts the premise that appears
 
as a redefinition, he will  have  to accept  
Swift’s conclusion about the halfpence.
At
 
times Swift offers his definition  in the form of a Trojan horse—  
something which appears to be neutral but which in fact contains his
 strongest forces or arguments. The Examiner, in particular, often
 protests his neutrality in political issues and purports to “examine”
 current
 
events with an unbiased perspective, only to employ definitions  
of crucial words in order to argue pointedly for the Harley ministry’s
 position under cover of this neutrality. Similarly, in the first Drapier' s
 Letter Swift employs a Trojan horse tactic in his definition of “Lawful
 Money,” “Half-Penny,” and “Farthing” in order to refute Wood’s
 halfpence. Under the appearance of explaining the terminology of
 English law concerning coinage, the Drapier says, “By the Laws of
 England, the several Metals are divided into Lawful or
 
true Metal and  
unlawful or false Metals the Former comprehends Silver or Gold, the
 Latter all Baser Metals” (10: 8). He reiterates his definition by citing a
 later law which “shews that by the
 
Words Half-Penny and Farthing of  
Lawful Money in that Statute concerning the passing of Pence, 
is meant a small Coin in Half-pence and Fartlungs of Silver” (10: 10). If
 Swift’s opponent accepts his definitions, he must logically accept
 Swift’s conclusion that Wood’s brass halfpence are not legal currency;
 the argument is thus lost before it has even begun. Here Swift, as the
 Drapier, adopts the guise of an unlearned man simply seeking to
 explain difficult legal language in terms more comprehensible to his
 audience, but underneath the apparently neutral definition lurks one of
 Swift’s central arguments against Wood’s patent
Most often, however, the battle with and for words is more nakedly
 
conducted. In Some Remarks Upon A Letter to Seven Lords, for
 example, Swift quibbles with the expression of the writer he is
 answering and replies, “As for the Head that has done the greatest
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Mischief to 
the
 Kingdom, I cannot consent it should  fall, untill he and I  
have settled the Meaning of
 
the Word Mischief" (3: 196). Words are  
the central weapons in such battles, and there is no pretense of
 impartiality or disinterestedness. This battle over words and their
 definitions occurs throughout the political works especially; most often
 Swift defines a controversial word or phrase in
 
a government document  
he defends or attacks. So, for example, in The Conduct of the Allies,
 Swift defines the phrase “the whole Strength of the Nation” from the
 Grand Alliance treaty to mean the strength of the King’
s
 revenues but  
not also everything he can mortgage or borrow (6: 18). Through this
 definition Swift justifies the Harley ministry’
s
 decision not to increase  
supplies for the war; in doing so, he explicitly refutes the Whig
 definition of
 
the phrase and thereby refutes their war policy. The side  
that
 
wins the contest of definitions, in this case Swift’ s side and Swift’s  
definitions, wins the support of the populace.
Of course while he
 
worked for Harley’s Tory administration, Swift  
always claimed that he
 
himself was a Whig—an “old Whig” rather than  
a follower of the speculators and stock-jobbers the party
 
had become—  
in matters of governance such as in support for a constitutional
 monarchy. Swift argued repeatedly that he had not changed, but the two
 parties had. This conflict between Whig and Tory (or old Whig)
 definitions of the same words is continually re-enacted in Swift’s
 works. One of the clearest examples is the battle over the
 
definition  of  
“Wealth of the Nation”: in Examiner 13 Swift bemoans the corruption
 that “the Wealth of the Nation, that used to be reckoned by the Value of
 Land, is now computed
 
by the Rise and Fa ll of Stocks” (3: 13). Over  
and over Swift
 
argues that the landowners are  the only proper judges  of  
what is right for the nation, and he constantly scorns or satirizes the
 “Stock-jobbers and moneyed-men.” The same argument recurs in
 another definition in the sixth Drapier’s Letter: “I take the proper
 Definition of Law to be 
the
 Will of the Majority of  those who have
Property
 
in Land" (10: 134). In consonance with the Tory view, Swift  
insists that the landowners are the truest citizens and the rightful
 possessors of legal and political power. The issue in these definitions
 is not primarily lexical correctness (although one of the corruptions
 Swift invariably charges his opponents with is misuse of language);
 rather the fundamental principles of government are being argued
 through the medium of these definitions. The fact that the Whigs still
 hold or have just held much of the political and economic power of
 England is what enables them to control the language; now that the
 Tories are newly in power (this is Swift’s first Examiner), the “thing”
 can only be corrected after 
the
 word is corrected. Swift’s contribution to  
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the new Tory government is that while Harley’s ministry corrects the
 
previous Whig administration’s policies, Swift corrects their words.
 This is the purpose of The Examiner's definitions.
Another variation of employing definition for argumentative
 
purposes to which Swift frequently resorts is defining or rather
 misdefining the words of his opponents. In many works in which he
 directly or indirectly 
answers
 the language of others, he often “explains”  
their words by putting the least charitable interpretation possible upon
 them, or distorting them altogether, and then claiming that the resultant
 definition is theirs rather than his. Martin Price argues that this is a
 “constant” trick of Swift’s: because the power of words depends on
 association, Swift changes those associations subtly and subverts his
 foes’ terms.6 Very often, however, the subversion is not at all subtle.
 In Examiner 40, for example, Swift says of the
 
Whigs and one of their  
key terms, “A Revolution-Principle, as their Writings and Discourses
 have taught us to define it, 
is
 a Principle perpetually disposing Men to  
Revolutions” (3: 147); here Swift reverses the frequent Whig claim
 that they are the party that accomplished and supported the Glorious
 Revolution of 1688 and the party that
 
safeguards the Act of Settlement,  
guaranteeing the succussion of the Hanoverians. He employs a (mis-)
 definition 
no
 Whig would agree to in order to charge the Whigs with  
sympathies for the Pretender, and at 
the
 same time he claims that this is  
the Whig definition
 
rather than his own. Another way he accomplishes  
this shift is to impersonate his opponent and have that
 
opponent restate  
or redefine his own words in a more “honest” and less attractive way.
 In A Letter of Thanks from My Lord Wharton to Bishop Asaph,
 “Wharton” first refers to
 
“Such  a Peace, as would have answer'd all our  
Prayers,” then restates the same phrase to the more mercenary “When
 the Dutch could get nothing by the War, nor we Whigs lose anything
 by a Peace,” and finally restates it in baser and even more mercenary
 terms: “When we had exhausted all the Nation’s Treasure.. .and so far
 enrich’d ourselves, and beggar’d our Fellow-Subjects, as to bring them
 under a Necessity of submitting to what Conditions we should
 
think fit  
to impose” (6: 154). Swift’s impersonation of Wharton here is part
 
of  
his campaign to justify the Tory-negotiated peace with France by
 accusing Whig leaders, especially Wharton and the Duke of
 Marlborough,
 
of prolonging  the war out of personal greed.
A final example of a misdefinition “corrected” by an argument
 masquerading as a redefinition involves one of
 
the more controversial  
terms of 
the 
age—“passive  obedience.” In The Sentiments of a Church-  
of-England Man Swift cites a misdefinition of passive obedience that
 began in the early seventeenth century: “The Clergy of the two Reigns
6
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before the Revolution..
.
under the Terms of Passive Obedience, and  
Non-Resistance, are
 
said to have preached up  the unlimited Power of the  
Prince” (2: 16). He follows this misdefinition with a careful
 redefinition espousing the Tory or old Whig view that, according to the
 original and correct sense of
 
the word, obedience is due to the whole  
balanced government including the Commons and
 
Lords, and not only  
the King. The results of this misdefinition are wide-ranging and
 profound: Swift calls this mistake “the Foundation of all the political
 Mistakes” in Hobbes’ Leviathan, a book which has done enough
 damage to church and state 
(2: 
16). More seriously, this
misunderstanding of the term passive obedience has led to a slavish
 dependency on the King from the clergy and their congregations, and
 this dependency has in some ways contributed to the need for the
 Revolution of 1688. In The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man
 (1708) Swift’s purpose is generally to explain and defend the position
 of a moderate churchman aligned with neither party, and thus this
 misdefinition-redefinition serves little further argumentative purpose.
 But
 
by the time he writes Examiner 33 in March, 1710, Swift is much  
more fully committed politically, and 
his
 exposure of the misdefinition  
and his redefinition of “passive obedience” have a clearer partisan
 political purpose. Swift introduces
 
his redefinition  in order to refute the  
charges of “Arbitrary Power, 
Tyranny,
 and Popery” that the Whigs hurl  
at the Tories. He announces as the purpose of Examiner 33, “I will
 therefore give two Descriptions of Passive Obedience; 
the
 first, as it is  
falsely charged by the Whigs; the other, as it is really professed
 
by the  
Tories” (3: 112). The opening of each definition provides a fair sense
 of Swift’s slant: the “Whig” definition begins, “The Doctrine of
 Passive Obedience 
is
 to believe, that a King, even in a limited  
Monarchy, holding his Power only from God, is only answerable to
 him. That, such a King is above all Law; that the cruellest Tyrant
 must be submitted to in all Things; and if his Commands be ever so
 unlawful, you must neither fly nor resist, nor use any other Weapons
 than Prayers and 
Tears
” (3: 112). Opposed to  this  is the “correct”  Tory  
definition: “They think that in every Government, whether Monarchy
 or Republick, there is placed a supream, absolute, unlimited Power, to
 which Passive Obedience is due....That, among us, as every Body
 knows, this Power is lodged in the King or Queen, together with the
 Lords and
 
Commons of the Kingdom” (3: 113). Clearly Swift intends  
to throw the Whig accusation right back upon them. This redefinition
 in effect denies to the Whigs the “Revolution Principles” each party
 strives so hard to claim. Usually the Whigs proclaim most proudly
 their part in the Revolution, but if Swift’s redefinition is accepted the
7
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Whigs can only
 
be seen as having opposed the  Revolution. They must  
also
 
logically be the current  supporters of the Pretender, since James is 
the monarch to whom they owe absolute “passive obedience.” Again
 the ostensible reason for Swift’s redefinition (and indeed the often-stated
 purpose of The Examiner itself) is to set the record straight, but this
 Whig misdefinition-Tory redefinition in fact serves the advancement of
 an argument rather than lexical accuracy, indeed, at the cost of lexical
 accuracy.
After his (mis-)definitions Swift frequently makes the ingenuous
 
claim that his is the only possible interpretation; by their tone and,
 indeed, by their very presence such protests are generally a very clear
 signal that Swift is well aware he is twisting his opponents’ words
 back on them. In the fourth Drapier’s Letter Swift answers 
some
 letters  
published in London newspapers that he claims were directed, if not
 written, by Wood in order to attack the Drapier and the refusal of the
 Irish to accept Wood’
s
 halfpence. Swift plays with some of the phrases  
from these letters and offers just 
such
 a (mis-)definition and protest:  
“They are going to Shake off their Dependence upon the Crown of
 England; that is to say, they are going to chuse another King: For
 there can be no other Meaning in this Expression, however some may
 pretend to strain it” (10: 61). Swift’s misinterpretation again serves a
 political purpose: Wood’s expression refers to the controversy
 
over the  
legal right of the English Parliament to make laws for Ireland, but
 Swift deliberately exaggerates and misdefines Wood’s words in order to
 accuse Wood of “Slander” when actually it is Swift who slanders Wood.
 By protesting against other interpretations of these words, Swift
 indicates their very presence and, in fact, calls attention to them. Swift
 then employs this misdefinition as a preface to his own definition of “a
 depending Kingdom,”
 which
 once again carries his c ntral argument that  
the English Parliament alone cannot make laws for Ireland alone.
Swift does fight to keep words politically correct, but he is far
 
more often forced to “destroy” them. This is perhaps because of the
generally losing position the Tories held during the early eighteenth
 century: Swift enjoyed a few brief years during the Tories’ political
 control and produced official Tory documents like The Conduct of the
 Allies which set the linguistic and political record straight, but even
 most of this short period was spent fending off Whig encroachments on
 Tory power. Most of his career, however, he wrote in opposition to
 Whig governments solidly in power. A second reason Swift spent
 more time attacking the language of his opponents is that his concern
 for the use of words is habitually far more often a concern for their
 misuse, whether politically motivated or 
not.
 In his various writings  
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about language, his many satires of the misuse of language (A Tale of a
 
Tub, Argument Against Abolishing Christianity, Tatler 230), and his
 various rhetorical strategies designed to guard language, Swift offers far
 more criticisms than answers. Speaking in particular about the Irish
 tracts and the Drapier's Letters, Edward Said argues that this is Swift’s
 great skill: 
“
His element was language, as was the enemy’s, but far  
more than anyone he was able to exploit the negative aspects of the
 medium: its airiness, its impermanence, its potential for solipsistic
 debasement.”7
What Irvin Ehrenpreis says of Swift’s sermons might well be
 
extended to the rest of his prose: “His obsession with correctness of
 language led him to practice definition and redefinition 
as
 part of his  
rhetoric.”8 This obsession manifests itself throughout Swift’s work,
 from the overt prescriptions like the
 
Proposal to the wildest satires of  
language abuse in the 
Tale,
 and definition in  all its forms and rhetorical  
techniques plays a central role in the pursuit of this correctness. There
 is, however, more to Swift’s use of definition than its power to correct
 the word-thing
 
relationship. What Swift says sarcastically of Tindall’s  
work provides a fair final assessment of 
his
 own definitions: “The  
Strength of his Arguments is equal to the Clearness of his Definitions”
 (2: 81). In some definitions linguistic clarity is Swift’s primary goal,
 but in his political arguments the “clarity” is perhaps evident only to
 Tories. In Swift’s definitions it is more likely that the clarity of his
 arguments 
is
 equal to the strength of his definitions. Throughout his  
prose, this disenfranchisement
 
through definition is  a  central strategy of  
Swift’s politics
 
of discourse and discourse of politics.
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